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ABSTRACT
This study examines two issues relating to fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. The first issue examines factors 
involved with fraudulent financial reporting practices; i.e. predisposition (i.e. related party transactions, history of prior 
violations, founders on board), motive (i.e. economic factor, ownership factor, political factor) and opportunity (i.e. 
poor corporate governance). Then, the second issue looks into the relationship between earnings management and the 
occurrences of fraudulent financial reporting. The study uses a matched sample of 53 firms that were convicted of issuing 
fraudulent financial statements during the period from 1996 to 2007. Our results show that firms with fewer related 
party transactions, higher number of prior violations, and higher proportion of founders on board are more likely to 
“tip” over the edge into fraudulent financial reporting. We also find that the corporate environment most likely to lead 
to fraudulent financial reporting is characterised by accounting practices that are already “pushing the envelope” on 
earnings management. Furthermore, we find that firms are embroiled in fraudulent financial reporting when non-family 
and non-foreigners own the company, and when the level of financial distress is high. As expected, our results also show 
that firms involved in fraudulent financial reporting have significantly poor corporate governance structures whereby 
the audit quality is lower and outside directors seem overcommitted. However, we find no evidence that firm’s political 
connection factor or the level of board independence play a significant role in the potential for fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Keywords: Fraudulent financial reporting; earnings management; corporate governance 
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji dua isu yang berkaitan dengan penipuan laporan kewangan di Malaysia. Isu pertama mengkaji 
faktor-faktor yang terlibat dengan amalan penipuan laporan kewangan; iaitu kecenderungan pengurusan (urus niaga 
pihak berkaitan, sejarah pelanggaran undang-undang terdahulu, kewujudan pengasas di dalam organisasi), motif 
(faktor ekonomi, faktor saham pemilikan, faktor politik) dan peluang (kelemahan tadbir urus korporat). Kemudian, isu 
kedua melibatkan hubungan antara pengurusan perolehan (“earnings management”) dan kejadian penipuan laporan 
kewangan. Kajian ini menggunakan sampel yang dipadankan daripada 53 syarikat yang telah disabitkan dengan penipuan 
penyata kewangan dalam tempoh dari tahun 1996 hingga 2007. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa firma-firma 
yang mempunyai kurang urus niaga pihak berkaitan, lebih tinggi sejarah pelanggaran undang-undang terdahulu, dan 
lebih tinggi bahagian (“proportion”) pengasas di dalam organisasi adalah lebih cenderung untuk terlibat di dalam 
penipuan laporan kewangan. Kami juga mendapati bahawa persekitaran korporat yang berkemungkinan membawa 
kepada penipuan laporan kewangan dicirikan oleh amalan pengurusan pendapatan yang kurang beretika. Tambahan 
pula, kajian juga mendapati bahawa firma-firma terbabit dalam penipuan laporan kewangan apabila individu bukan 
keluarga dan individu bukan warga asing yang memiliki saham firma terbabit dan apabila prestasi kewangan berada 
dalam tahap yang sangat lemah. Seperti yang dijangka, hasil kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa firma yang terlibat 
dalam penipuan pelaporan kewangan mempunyai struktur tadbir urus korporat yang lemah di mana kualiti audit adalah 
rendah dan pengarah mempunyai terlalu banyak komitmen dengan firma luar yang lain. Walau bagaimanapun, kami 
mendapati tiada bukti bahawa faktor berkaitan politik atau kehadiran pengarah bebas memainkan peranan penting 
dalam penglibatan dalam penipuan laporan kewangan.
Kata kunci: Laporan penipuan kewangan; pengurusan perolehan; tadbir urus korporat
INTRODUCTION
In the United States (US), corporate fraud cost is about 
$US600 billion annually (Frieswick 2003). Kaminski, 
Wetzel and Guan (2004) described fraudulent financial 
reporting (FFR) as “a matter of grave social and economic 
concern.” According to the Treadway Commission (1987), 
FFR is “intentional or reckless misconduct, whether act or 
omission, that results in materially misleading financial 
statements. It may entail gross and deliberate distortion 
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of corporate records and the misapplication of accounting 
principles.” The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) notes that FFR occurs with management’s 
knowledge and consent (ACFE 1993, sec 1.201). 
FFR is different from earnings management (EM) 
with respect to the acceptability of accounting treatment 
(GAAP), while EM is still within GAAP, but pushing its 
limits. Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) revealed 
that Malaysia is among the top ten countries under the 
category of most earnings aggressive group. Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki (2003) discovered that Malaysia, Hong Kong 
and Singapore have by far the worst EM ratings. According 
to Landsittel (2000), FFR starts out small as EM, and grows 
to become full-blown ‘cooking the books.’ Howe (1999) 
suggests that firms turn to FFR when they have limited 
opportunities to change to more aggressive EM methods. 
Malaysia has substantial implications for corporate 
governance and FFR. In addition, poor investor protection 
and weak law enforcement create conditions for FFR. 
From 2006-2010, the Securities Commission (SC) 
initiated criminal prosecutions against Transmile, Megan 
Media, Nasioncom, Wimems, Welli Multi and MEMs 
Technology. Given the association between FFR and 
corporate governance, this study explains the factors 
associated with FFR in Malaysia, and examines whether 
firms that commit FFR differ from comparable firms in the 
fraud and pre-fraud year, via three questions: (1) Is there 
any significant difference on the firm’s predisposition, 
motives and opportunity factors between fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent financial reporting companies in Malaysia? 
(2) What are the factors that lead to the occurrences of 
FFR in Malaysia? (3) Do fraud firms engage in EM in the 
years prior to fraud year? 
We collected a sample of 53 firms where a formal 
investigation by the SC for accounting irregularities 
between 1996 and 2007 led to an enforcement action 
against them. We examined variables measuring multiple 
aspects (related party transactions, history of prior 
violations, founders on board), motives (economic, 
ownership and political factors) and opportunities (poor 
corporate governance). We tested for differences in the 
variables between firms that commit fraud and an industry-
matched counterpart. In addition to the univariate analysis, 
we performed logistic regressions on the combined sample 
to predict the likelihood of FFR. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING IN MALAYSIA
FFR and related issues are now taking center stage. 
Regulators are seeking to ensure that accounting processes 
are reasonably “fail-safe” to maintain confidence in 
companies’ financial reporting and markets. Compared 
to the US, the situation in Malaysia is weak because: (1) 
in the US, corporate law enforcement has more bite, lower 
standards of criminal proof and extensive prosecutorial 
resources; (2) failures come under intense media and 
public debate; and (3) investors and shareholders are more 
willing and able to file shareholder suits against directors, 
professionals and other parties.
Malaysian records from 2006 onwards show that 
there has been substantial progress in the capacity and 
effectiveness of market disciplinary mechanisms in 
highlighting corporate misconduct and fraud. The SC 
has shown that for 2009 and 2010, there were 18 and 26 
enforcement actions, respectively. There have been more 
enforcement actions and whistleblower cases since the 
SC became a disclosure-based regulatory in 2003.1 Table 
1 presents summary of criminal prosecution for financial 
statement fraud initiated by SC.
TABLE 1. Criminal prosecution initiated (1998-2007)
 Year Number of Cases
 1998 3 
 1999 5 
 2000 3
 2001 4
 2002 8
 2003 9
 2004 9
 2005 11
 2006 10
 2007 14
 2008 12
 2009 18
 2010 26
Cheng et al. (2010) found that in the US, institutional 
owners use class-action lawsuits to discipline managers 
for not following regulations. In Malaysia, punishment 
for corporate crime is lacking. The longest sentence for 
an offender under the 1983 Securities Industries Act was 
a one year prison term, on Chin Keem Feung and Shukri 
Sheikh Abdul Tawab, the former Independent Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) of Transmile Group Berhad 
(SC Malaysia 2012), compared to the 25-year jail sentence 
that WorldCom chief executive, Bernie Ebbers received. 
In June 2005, the Singaporean authorities arrested the CEO 
for his role in the China Aviation Oil Corp Ltd’s US$554 
million losses from derivatives trading and sentenced 
him to over four years in prison (Leen 2007). It is hence 
timely for a review so that all investors feel assured that 
governance is truly high. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Firms would avoid FFR if they knew they would get caught. 
Gereish (2003) posited that as long as there is uncertainty 
whether or not the deception will be detected, the firm may 
comply with GAAP requirements. This paper argues that the 
decision to engage in FFR requires that the firm must first 
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be predisposed towards adopting FFR, and be motivated 
to prepare FFR because of economic, ownership and 
political pressures. Poor corporate governance structures 
also make it possible to release false financial statements 
to the public. The prime focus of our study is to examine 
if predisposition, motives and opportunity have an impact 
on FFR; and the relationship between EM and FFR.
PREDISPOSITION FOR FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL 
REPORTING
Predisposition indicates a ‘tendency’ to select certain 
illegal activities because of socialisation or organisational 
processes. According to Dunn (1999), the history of prior 
violation and an unusually high number of related party 
transactions (RPTs) can lead to deviant corporate culture 
that predisposes a firm to issue FFR. The continuing 
influence of the founders on the firm’s Board of Directors 
(BoDs) is an additional characteristic that helps to 
perpetuate this culture (Gereish 2003).
HISTORY OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS
Researchers have found that firms convicted of illegal 
actions have a history of prior violations (Baucus 1994; 
Davidson et al. 1994). Pfeffer (2002) posits that as policies 
and procedures become institutionalised through repeated 
use, they become acceptable social behaviors. Gereish 
(2003) examined organisational culture and FFR, and found 
that companies with a history of corporate illegal activities 
are more likely to issue FFR.
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Many high profile financial statement frauds in recent 
years have involved RPTs2 in some way. Theory suggests 
two alternative views of RPTs: (1) they represent a conflict 
of interest and this is consistent with agency issues (Berle 
& Means 1932; Jensen & Meckling 1976); and (2) they 
rationally fulfill other economic demands of a company, 
and are mechanisms that bond the party to the company. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000b) provide evidence in India 
that RPTs are especially beneficial if the company is an 
affiliate of a diversified business group in an emerging 
market. Whether RPTs create or destroy value, especially 
in emerging markets is an open empirical question.
FOUNDERS ON THE FIRM’S BOARD
Evidence suggests that continuing presence of founders 
may make organisational culture more homogeneous 
(Davidson et al. 1994). Founders may have a very strong 
emotional commitment to the firm, such that they will 
do anything to ensure its survival, including engaging in 
illegal activities. Gereish (2003) found that their influence 
is even more pronounced when they constitute a large 
percentage of the Board. Hence, the first hypothesis is:
H1 There is a significant relationship between 
predisposition (history of prior violations, existence 
of RPTs and founders on Board) and occurrences of 
FFR
MOTIVATION FOR FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Being predisposed to FFR alone is insufficient; there must 
be a strong motivation for the firm to adopt an aggressive 
accounting policy. Hence, it is hypothesised that a firm is 
motivated to commit FFR when it has a strong economic 
need to report results more favorably than it would if it 
followed GAAP requirements (Rosner 2003); and when 
the ownership arrangements encourage a short-term 
orientation to financial performance (Shleifer & Vishny 
1997). 
FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS
Poor financial conditions may indicate a weak control 
environment, allowing the perpetration of fraud (AICPA 
1997). Managers of firms with weak financial condition 
are more likely to window dress to disguise temporary 
difficulties (Rosner 2003). Hence, under severe financial 
distress, a firm might fraudulently report more favorable 
results. 
OWNERSHIP FACTORS
A firm has a stronger motivation to commit FFR when it is 
non-family-managed (Shleifer & Vishny 1997), with lower 
foreign ownership interest (Khanna & Palepu 2000a).
Family Ownership  Family ownership could affect the 
demand and supply of quality financial reporting, i.e., 
the entrenchment and alignment effects. The presence 
of family members holding important positions may 
result in inferior corporate governance. Another source 
of entrenchment is potentially greater information 
asymmetry between families and other shareholders, 
resulting in family members having both the incentive 
and the opportunity to manipulate accounting earnings 
for private rents. 
A competing view is the alignment effect, that firms 
with high family ownership have incentives to report 
earnings in good faith, and thus, financial reporting is of 
higher quality. Family firms are less likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting earnings 
because it potentially could damage the family’s reputation, 
wealth and long-term firm performance. 
Foreign Ownership  According to Khanna and Palepu 
(2000a), foreign-investors are likely to insist on higher 
standards of governance and protection of minority rights. 
Hence, we expect that firms’ with foreign investors will 
be less likely to engage in FFR. 
POLITICAL CONNECTION FACTOR
Politically connected firms are those owned and controlled 
by major shareholders and top management that are linked 
to politicians. These firms typically derive gains from their 
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connections3 over and above the payments that they make.4 
Hence, such firms have more tendencies to misreport 
and overstate earnings. We therefore hypothesise that 
politically connected firms are more likely to engage 
in FFR, given the benefit of committing fraud is higher 
than the expected cost and penalty for fraud detection 
as follows:
H2 There is a significant relationship between motives 
(economic, ownership and political connections 
factors) and occurrences of FFR.
OPPORTUNITY FOR FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Empirical evidence suggests that opportunity to commit 
FFR increases when the firm has poor corporate governance 
structures, with few outsiders on the board, multiple 
directorships of board members and lower audit quality 
(Beasley 1996; Sharma 2004; Woodland & Reynolds 
2003).
LACK OF INDEPENDENT BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
recommends that listed firms adopt good governance 
practice by having a balanced board composed of at 
least one-third NEDs. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali 
(2006) revealed that NED dominated boards do not affect 
company performance, implying that the said MCCG 
recommendation may not work in Malaysia, because most 
NEDs are selected not for their expertise and experience 
but for their networking contacts and contracts. 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS OF BOARD MEMBERS
“Multiple directorships” is where directors sit on more 
than one board. Holding too many directorships may make 
the directors so busy, resulting in less managerial oversight 
(Morck et al. 1988), and more possibility of FFR. Directors 
who serve on multiple boards would promote empire 
building amongst multiple firms they serve by engaging 
in inter-corporate collusion and inter-organisational elite 
co-optation and cooperation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; 
Useem 1984). 
AUDIT QUALITY
The positive association between audit fees and earnings 
manipulation is relatively well established. It is argued that 
fraud firms would have higher audit fees than no-fraud 
firms since: (1) fraud firms present greater audit risk and 
auditors are likely to extend the scope and rigor of their 
audits; and (2) from a risk-based perspective, auditors may 
increase audit effort and therefore, audit fees for firms 
with poor governance. We therefore predict a positive 
association between audit fees and the occurrences of 
FFR as follows:
H3 There is a significant relationship between opportunity 
(poor corporate governance) and occurrences of 
FFR.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003); Bhattacharya, Daouk and 
Welker (2003); and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) 
have reported that EM practices are prevalent in Malaysian 
listed firms. Dechow et al. (2011) suggested that firms 
would turn to FFR when they have limited opportunities 
to change to more aggressive earnings management 
tactics. Companies then engage in FFR by creating 
artificial reserves, understating reserve liabilities, using 
creative acquisition accounting practices or manipulating 
GAAP to perpetuate myths involving company “growth.” 
Argenti (1976) noted that managers may resort to fraud 
and overstate earnings when the firm’s troubles no longer 
seem temporary and EM cannot sufficiently disguise them. 
Therefore, the final hypothesis is:
H4 There is a significant positive relationship between 
earnings management and the occurrences of FFR.
RESEARCH DESIGN
SAMPLE
For the 1996-2007 period, 76 fraudulent companies were 
taken as the sample. However, 10 private companies 
were excluded because they are not subjected to the same 
governance and disclosure requirements as listed firms. A 
fraud firm is included if the appropriate annual report data 
and corporate governance information (from corporate 
annual reports, companies’ handbooks, Malaysia Stock 
Exchange and SC online search database) is available. 
Due to the unavailability of this information, another 13 
companies were excluded leaving 53 firms.5
Diagram 1 shows the fraud year in each firm’s SC 
enforcement releases, which is the earliest set of financial 
statements for which the firm was convicted of fraud; and 
the date where the firms were first publicly alleged to have 
manipulated earnings. 
DIAGRAM 1. Chronology of events for a typical firm subject to SC enforcement for violating GAAP
Control firm matched by 
industry, year and size
Fraud year SC investigation 
disclosed
Issue date of the SC 
Enforcement Release
Announcement of alleged 
earnings manipulation
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We also identified a control firm with companies 
similar in industry and size (total assets) but where FFR 
was undetected. The major newspapers and both the Bursa 
Malaysia and SC Enforcement Releases were searched to 
ensure that the matched firm was not itself a fraud firm. 
The final sample for this study consists of 53 fraud firms 
and 53 matched non-fraud firms as in Table 2 (Panels A 
and B). 
MODELS AND VARIABLES
The following cross-sectional logistic regression models 
analyse the relationship between various determinants of 
fraud and FFR.6
Model 1:
FFR	 =	 β0	+	β1PRIORS	+	β2RPTs	+	β3FOUND% +
	 	 β4DISTRESS	+	β5FAMOWN + 
	 	 β6FOREIGNOWN	+	β5POLITICS +
	 	 β6BODIND	+	β5CROSSDIR	+	β6AUDQ	+	ε	 (1)
Model 2:
FFR	 =	 β0 +	β1PRIORS	+	β2RPTs	+	β3FOUND% + 
	 	 β4DISTRESS	+	β5FAMOWN +
	 	 β6FOREIGNOWN	+	β5POLITICS + 
	 	 β6BODIND	+	β5CROSSDIR	+	β6AUDQ +
	 	 EM	+	ε	 (2)
Model 1 examines a variety of previously suggested 
determinants of FFR. The dependent variable, FFR is 
measured dichotomously (Beasley 1996). The independent 
variables comprise ten (10) factors that could lead to FFR 
(history of prior violations (PRIORS), number of related 
party transactions (RPTs), percentage of firm’s founders on 
board (FOUND), the level of financial distress (DISTRESS), 
percentage of family ownership (FAMOWN), percentage 
of foreign ownership (FOREIGNOWN), political factor 
(POLITICS), percentage of board independence (BODIND), 
percentage of directors having cross-directorship 
(CROSSDIR) and audit quality (AUDQ). Specifically, fraud 
firms are predisposed to FFR (history of PRIORS, RPTs and 
FOUND); are more strongly motivated to engage in FFR 
(economic, ownership and political connections factors); 
and have a better opportunity to issue FFR due to poor 
corporate governance.
Predisposi t ion  (History of  PRIORS,  RPTs ,  and 
FOUND)  PRIORS is measured by the number of times 
each sample firm has been investigated and convicted 
for violations related to financial misrepresentation by 
Federal government agencies, Bursa Malaysia and SC in 
the 5-year period prior to the fraud year (Baucus & Near 
1991); RPTs by the number of separate RPTs disclosed 
in the annual report (Gereish 2003); and FOUND by the 
number of founders of the firm who are on the Board, 
divided by the total number of directors on the Board 
(Dunn 1999).
Motives (DISTRESS, FAMOWN, FOREIGNOWN, POLITICS)  FFR 
can be due to either economic, ownership or political 
connection factors (see Rosner 2003; Beasley, Carcello 
& Hermanson 1999); and DISTRESS is measured by the 
Altman Z-score, as follows:
 Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 (3)
Where:
X1 = working capital to total assets.
X2  = retained earnings to total assets
TABLE 2. Panel A – Corporate scandal frequency
 Year Number
 1996 1
 1997 0
 1998 1
 1999 3
 2000 5
 2001 10
 2002 10
 2003 4
 2004 8
 2005 5
 2006 3
 2007 3
 Total 53
Note: The first year involved in an accounting scandal for 53 firms 
where a formal investigation by the SC of Malaysia for accounting 
irregularities leads to an enforcement action against the firm 
between 1996 and 2007.
TABLE 2. Panel B – Distribution of Fraud among
Industry Sectors
 Number of Percentage (%)   Industry
 Fraud Firms 
 25 47.1% Industrial Product
 8 15.1% Trading & Services
 3 5.7% Technology
 5 9.4% Plantation
 10 18.9% Consumer Product
 1 1.9% Mining
 1 1.9% Property
 Total: 53 100% -
Data for EM starts from year 5 prior to fraud year 
until year before the first year of accounting fraud. 
Since the actual occurrences of EM are unknown, the 
formula of performance-adjusted Modified Jones model 
(Kothari, Leone & Wasley 2005) was carried out yearly 
for those five year periods to identify EM, obtained from 
DataStream, annual reports and Bursa Malaysia On Disc 
CD-ROM. 
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X3 = earnings before interest and taxes to total 
 assets
X4 = market value of equity to total liabilities, and
X5 = net sales to total assets
A dummy variable is coded 1 for low Altman Z-Score 
(< 2.073) and 0 otherwise (Altman 1993; Gul 2006). 
Altman (1993) assumes that firms with Z-score of less than 
2.073 have a stronger economic motive to issue FFR.
In this study, FAMOWN is measured by percentage 
of FAMOWN in the top ten largest shareholders; and 
FOREIGNOWN by the percentage of shares held by foreign 
shareholders in top ten largest shareholders.
POLITICS is coded “1” for firms owned and controlled 
by individuals, next of kin, relatives, or associates linked 
to political parties and “0” otherwise (Johnson & Mitton 
2003).
Opportunity (Poor corporate governance)  BODIND is 
measured as the proportion of independent NEDs (Sharma 
2004); CROSSDIR as the proportion of directors on board 
having at least one additional directorship in another 
company to total number of directors on board (Haniffa 
& Hudaib 2006); and AUDQ by the ratio of audit fees to 
total assets (Che Haat 2006).
Table 3 is a summary of the operationalisation of the 
variables. Model 2 adds the predictive variable, earnings 
management (EM) to the same independent variables in 
Model 1. We expect to find greater evidence of EM among 
fraud firms in the period before the scandal years and in 
the fraud year itself. 
TABLE 3. Operationalisation of the research variables
       Variables Acronym        Operationalisation
 Dependent variable  
 Occurrences of fraudulent financial reporting FFR A dummy variable coded 1 if the firm issued FFR;   
   and 0 otherwise.
 Independent variables  
 History of prior violations PRIORS The number of times each of the sample firms had been 
   investigated and convicted by the Federal government 
   agencies; Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission of 
   Malaysia in the 5-year period prior to the fraud year.
 Related party transactions RPTs The number of RPTs the firm has
 Founders on board (%) FOUND The percentage of FOUND on BoDs
 Financial distress DISTRESS A dummy variable coded 1 for low Altman Z-Score
   (< 2.073); and 0 otherwise.
 Family ownership (%) FAMOWN The percentage of FAMOWN in top ten largest 
   shareholders.
 Foreign ownership (%) FOREIGNOWN The percentage of FOREIGNOWN in top ten largest 
   shareholders.
 Political connection POLITICS A dummy variable coded 1 if the firms owned and 
   controlled by individuals, next of kin, relatives or 
   associates linked to the top government officials of the 
   political parties in Malaysia; and “0” otherwise.
 Lack of independent board (%) BODIND The percentage of outside directors on the board of 
   directors.
 Multiple directorships (%) CROSSDIR The proportion of directors on  board having at least one 
   additional directorship in another company to total 
   number of directors on board.
 Audit quality AUDQ Ratio of audit fees to total assets.
 Earnings management EM Measured by performance matched discretionary 
   accruals (DAC) based on Kothari, Leone and Wasley’s 
   (2005) model.
MEASUREMENT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
This study uses Kothari et al.’s (2005) model to measure 
EM. First, total accruals is calculated as the change 
in non-cash current assets minus change in current 
liabilities excluding the current portion of long-term 
debt, depreciation and amortisation, scaled by lagged 
total assets. Second, the Jones model DAC is estimated 
cross-sectionally using all-firm year observations for each 
industrial sector.
 TACCit/TAit-1	=	 α0	+	α1(1/TAit-1)	+	α2+
   REVit/TAit-1	+	α3PPEit/TAit-1 + 
	 	 	 α4ROAit	+	εit  (4) 
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Where:
TACC = total accruals
TA   = total assets
+REV = change in revenue
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment
ROA = return on assets 
The estimated values of TACC in the above model 
are normal accruals given the sales and firms’ assets. The 
estimates	for	coefficients	α1,	α2, α3 and α4 are obtained by 
sector classification from the regressions and then used to 
estimate performance-adjusted DAC as follows:
 DACit = TACCit/TAit-1 –	[α0	+	α1(1/TAit-1)	+	α2+
   REVit/TAit-1	+	α3PPEit/TAit-1	+	α4ROAit] (5)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Univariate Analysis  Table 4 shows the results of 
univariate analysis of these predispositions, motives 
and opportunity variables during fraud year. Since 
the descriptive statistics are for both continuous and 
dichotomous variables, T-stats and Chi-square tests were 
used to test for differences where appropriate. They 
show that there are statistical differences in financial 
reporting characteristics between fraud firms and no-fraud 
firms with respect to all the predispositions variables. 
Predisposition is captured through the number of RPTs, 
PRIORS and FOUND, which are significantly different 
between fraud and no-fraud firms. Both PRIORS and 
FOUND produce significant results consistent with our 
expectation. However, RPTs result is opposite to the 
predicted direction. 
In Table 4, the results for FFR motive indicate that 
firms have a significantly different profile of ownership 
structures (i.e., FAMOWN) and DISTRESS during the fraud 
year, which is significantly higher for fraud firms. The 
results also show that family and foreign investors of 
fraud firms hold a lower percentage of the firm’s equity 
than the no-fraud firms, with no statistical difference in 
FOREIGNOWN between fraud and no-fraud firms during 
the fraud year. For DISTRESS, the results demonstrate that 
fraud firms are significantly more financially distressed 
than no-fraud firms, with no statistical difference between 
fraud and no-fraud firms with regards to POLITICS. 
TABLE 4. Comparing profiles of fraud and no-fraud firms
  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-Test      Chi-Square 
              Test
        Fraud (n = 53)       No Fraud (n = 53)  Fraud No Fraud
       (n = 53)  (n = 53)
 RPTs 4.06 5.439 7.57 7.626 -2.569**  
 PRIORS 1.51 2.484 0.06 0.323 3.960***  
 FOUND 0.14 0.187 0.06 0.105 2.297**  
 DISTRESS      62.8 (%) 37.2 (%)
 FAMOWN 5.97 13.041 22.23 22.73 -4.254***  
 FOREIGNOWN 4.84 11.496 5.42 13.287 -0.228  
 POLITICS      51.1 (%) 48.9 (%)
 BODIND 0.44 0.164 0.39 0.127 1.813*  
 CROSSDIR 0.64 0.235 0.53 0.244 2.107**  
 AUDQ 0.00082 0.00120 0.00073 0.00089 0.447
Contrary to expectations, the fraud firms have a 
significantly higher percentage of BODIND than the no-
fraud firms, significant at the 0.07 level. Also, directors 
of fraud firms, on average, held more directorships in 
unaffiliated companies than their no-fraud counterparts. 
However, there is no statistical difference between these 
two samples of firms with respect to audit fees.
Table 5 reports the Pearson correlations among the 
explanatory variables during the fraud year. The strongest 
correlations are -0.372 between FAMOWN and DISTRESS, 
and -0.322 between FAMOWN and PRIORS, indicating that 
family firms have significantly lower level of DISTRESS 
and less PRIORS, confirming prior research (e.g., Anderson 
& Reeb 2003; Khanna & Palepu 2000a). In addition, 
DISTRESS and PRIORS are significantly correlated with each 
other (0.229), suggesting that firms experiencing DISTRESS 
are also more likely to have PRIORS.
Interestingly, we find a positive relationship between 
FAMOWN and RPTs, marginally significant (0.194) at 10% 
level, suggesting that family firms engage in high number 
of RPTs within the group.
 In addition, there exists a strong positive correlation 
between BODIND and DISTRESS (0.270), which suggests that 
companies with independent board members seem to have 
more financial difficulties. Thus, the recommendation by 
the MCCG to have at least one third of the board comprising 
NEDs may not be beneficial for Malaysian listed firms. 
Overall, the Pearson correlations between the factors are 
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low, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to pose 
a problem in our regression analyses.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
H1-H3 predicts that there are significant relationships 
between predisposition, motives and opportunity, and FFR. 
In the fraud year, the results of Model 1 are presented in 
Table 6. For the predicted fraud firms, the model has R2 
value of 59% and correctly predicts 89.8% of the firms 
as no-fraud firms (92.2%) and fraud firms (87.2%). Table 
6 reveals RPTs, FAMOWN and audit fees are negatively 
related to the likelihood of FFR. On average, PRIORS, 
FOUND, DISTRESS and CROSSDIR are positively related to 
the occurrences of fraud. The coefficients of each variable 
are in the predicted direction. However, the coefficient for 
RPTs (0.027) and audit fees (0.033) variables produced 
inconsistent results. The negative sign of RPTs indicates 
that fraud firms have less RPTs than no-fraud firms. Upon 
reviewing the characteristic of the fraud and no-fraud firms 
during fraud year, we observe that 91% of the fraud firms 
are unaffiliated focused firms, while 89% of the no-fraud 
firms are affiliated with diversified business groups. With 
regards to audit fees, lower audit fees for fraud firms 
signify less audit effort, implying that in the fraud year, 
auditors failed to properly assess their audit risks. 
Looking at the relationship between FAMOWN and 
the occurrences of FFR, we observe a significant negative 
relationship that runs from this variable to the probability 
of occurrences of fraud. More importantly, this study 
documents evidence challenging the traditional view 
of the ‘entrenchment effect’ that family firms have both 
the incentive and opportunity to manipulate accounting 
earnings for gaining private rents.
The coefficient for PRIORS variable is positive and 
significant, consistent with our prediction that firms with a 
history of illegal activities are more likely to issue FFR. We 
also found evidence that FOUND is positively associated 
with the occurrences of FFR, which is shown by the 
significant positive coefficient. The result lends support to 
Gereish (2003) that regardless of their ownership interest, 
founders may have a very strong emotional commitment to 
the firm than anyone else, thus engaging in illegal activities 
to ensure the survival of their firms.7 
One notable point is the different coefficient sign 
for both FAMOWN and FOUND when we tested their 
relationship with the incidence of FFR. To obtain further 
evidence on FAMOWN and FOUND, we reviewed the 
characteristics of fraud and no-fraud firms during fraud 
year. A satisfactory explanation for this finding is that 12 
out of 53 fraud firms with high percentage of FAMOWN 
(ranging from 45% to 80%) have no founders on Board, 
and this could be the leading cause for FAMOWN and 
FOUND to have negative and positive signs, respectively. 
Thus, we believe that in Malaysia, FAMOWN and FOUND 
are not perfect complements, and conclude that these two 
constructs measure different concepts. 
DISTRESS is positively and significantly associated 
with FFR, with a significant positive association between 
CROSSDIR, and the incidence of FFR, suggesting that 
multiple directorships may have negative effects on the 
effective monitoring function of the board, and eventually 
on the company’s performance. Nonetheless, we find no 
evidence that FOREIGNOWN, POLITICS and BODIND are 
significantly related to fraud.
 We also examined fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
reporting companies in the year before the first year of 
accounting fraud. The year prior to the initial year of fraud 
was used to better represent the actual perpetration of the 
fraud. Our second regression model tests the association 
between predisposition, motives and opportunity; and the 
incidence of fraud with variables in the year before the 
fraud year, as in Model 1 of Table 7.
This model is well specified (p = 0.000) and has R2 
value of 66.9%, correctly predicting 97% of the firms as no-
fraud (98%) and fraud (96%). These results are generally 
similar to those of Model 1 in the year of the fraud, which 
indicate that the coefficients on PRIORS, FOUND, DISTRESS 
and CROSSDIR remain significantly positive for one year 
prior to the fraud year. Results in the year prior to the fraud 
year also indicate a negative association between FAMOWN, 
FOREIGNOWN and audit fees. The result is insignificant for 
RPTs even though this variable has similar negative sign as 
TABLE 6. Logistic regressions for fraud year (Model 1)
   Model 1
 Intercept  3.106
   (2.602)
 RPTs  -0.169**
   (4.889)
 PRIORS  2.929***
   (9.253)
 FOUND  11.413***
   (6.954)
 DISTRESS  3.012***
   (8.258)
 FAMOWN  -0.070**
   (4.221)
 FOREIGNOWN  -0.031
   (0.885)
 POLITICS  -0.690
   (0.724)
 CROSSDIR  4.310**
   (4.740)
 BODIND  -0.516
   (0.041)
 AUDQ  -1.476**
   (4.537)
 Cox & Snell R2 0.590
 N 106
Note: Logistic regressions for fraud year are reported in the table. 
The dependent variable is 1 for fraud firms. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Wald statistics 
are reported in parenthesis.
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TABLE 7. Logistic Regressions for One Year Prior to Fraud 
Year (Model 1)
   Model 1 – One Year Prior to
   the Fraud Year
 Intercept  -17.362**
   (4.101)
 RPTs  -0.193
   (1.926)
 PRIORS  4.545**
   (5.442)
 FOUND  35.623**
   (4.779)
 DISTRESS  10.660**
   (5.319)
 FAMOWN  -0.188**
   (4.572)
 FOREIGNOWN  -0.168**
   (3.934)
 POLITICS  -2.056
   (1.780)
 CROSSDIR  13.837**
   (4.111)
 BODIND  7.513
   (1.226)
 AUDQ  -2.570**
   (5.426)
 Cox & Snell R2 0.669
 N 106
Note: Logistic regressions for one year prior to fraud year are reported 
in the table. The dependent variable is 1 for fraud firms. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Wald statistics are reported in parenthesis.
in the fraud year. Additionally, in the year prior to the fraud 
year, FOREIGNOWN has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant, which suggest that foreign owners are more 
astute in lowering their ownership sooner than the rest. 
The results in the year prior to the fraud year provides 
additional support for the hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 that 
predisposition, motives and opportunity have an impact on 
a firm’s propensity to commit fraud. This suggests that a 
corporate environment that is ripe for fraud did exist even 
before the scandal year, indicating that pre-fraud financial 
statement factors have explanatory power in assessing the 
likelihood of fraud prior to its occurrence.
H4 states that there is a significant positive relationship 
between EM and the occurrences of FFR. To test this 
hypothesis, we included EM variable measured using DAC 
as an indicator of the propensity to commit fraud. Table 8 
reports the results for Model 2 for the fraud year and one 
year prior to fraud year. In general, our findings remain the 
same, i.e., similar to those of Model 1 for both fraud year 
and in year prior to fraud year. However, the addition of 
EM variable (DAC) increased the R2 to 60.3% from 57.7% 
and to 69.2% from 66.9%, respectively for fraud year and 
one year prior to fraud year, where the differences are 
significant at the 5% level. The DAC are found to have a 
significant and positive relationship with the incidence of 
fraud during fraud year and one year prior to fraud year at 
0.045 and 0.049 levels, respectively. Hence, we conclude 
that our results provide support for H4.
TABLE 8. Logistic regressions with addition of earnings management variable during fraud year and one year
prior to fraud year (Model 2)
   Model 2 (Fraud Year)  Model 2 (One Year Prior to Fraud Year)
 Intercept  -3.903*  -15.976**
   (3.034)  (3.924)
 RPTs  -0.203**  -2.740*
   (4.816)  2.718
 PRIORS  3.336***  6.292**
   (8.154)  (4.658)
 FOUND  15.512**  40.826**
   (6.533)  (4.531)
 DISTRESS  3.617***  13.499**
   (9.321)  (4.802)
 FAMOWN  -0.083**  -0.281**
   (4.565)  (4.751)
 FOREIGNOWN  -0.063  -0.277*
   (0.876)  (3.491)
 POLITICS  -0.723  -0.954
   (0.694)  (1.084)
 CROSSDIR  5.205**  16.022**
   (5.348)  (4.282)
 BODIND  0.209  1.338
   (0.006)  (0.047)
 AUDQ  -1.827**  -3.798**
   (4.569)  (5.160)
 EM  7.535**  1.530**
   (4.034)  (3.889)
 Cox & Snell R2 0.603  0.692
 N 106  106
Note: Logistic regressions with addition of earnings management variable measured using DAC for fraud year and one year prior to fraud year are 
reported in the table. The dependent variable is 1 for fraud firms. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Wald 
statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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DISCUSSION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
INCIDENCE OF FRAUD
To investigate whether fraud firms are more likely to 
regularly engage in EM than no-fraud firms, in the years 
prior to fraud year, we calculated DAC for one year to five 
years prior to the fraud year. The univariate analysis for 
both T-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was conducted 
to compare the mean and median of DAC during this five 
year period, as in Table 9. 
TABLE 9. Comparing earning management practices for fraud and no-fraud firms during five (5) years period prior to fraud year
       Fraud Firms    No Fraud Firms       Paired Differences
           (Fraud Firms - No Fraud Firms)
  N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon
       (T-Test) Signed Rank Test)
 EM(FY) 106 0.45 0.146 0.07 0.051 2.218** -4.630***
 EM1 106 0.31 0.101 0.08 0.053 1.669* -2.482**
 EM2 106 0.18 0.085 0.09 0.068 2.236** -1.778*
 EM3 106 0.15 0.090 0.09 0.059 1.772* -1.196
 EM4 106 0.14 0.071 0.11 0.044 0.887 -1.114
 EM5 106 0.21 0.107 0.14 0.064 0.905 -0.984
 EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM3] 102 0.30 0.020 -0.02 -0.010 1.877* -2.939***
 EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM4] 102 0.32 0.025 -0.03 -0.005 1.989* -1.945*
 EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM5] 102 0.25 -0.010 -0.07 -0.025 1.622 -2.139**       
Note: EM is discretionary accruals measured using performance-adjusted Modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). EM(FY) is discretionary accruals 
calculated for fraud year. EM1 is discretionary accruals calculated for one year prior to fraud year. EM2 is discretionary accruals calculated for 
two years prior to fraud year. EM3 is discretionary accruals calculated for three years prior to fraud year. EM4 is discretionary accruals calculated 
for four years prior to fraud year. EM5 is discretionary accruals calculated for five years prior to fraud year. EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM3] is 
defined as the growth of DAC during 3 years period prior to fraud year, and is calculated as [(DAC fraud year – DAC3 years prior to fraud year)/
DAC3 years prior to fraud year]. EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM4] is defined as the growth of DAC during 4 years period prior to fraud year, and is 
calculated as [(DAC fraud year – DAC4 years prior to fraud year)/DAC4 years prior to fraud year]. EMgrowth [EM(FY)_EM5] is defined as 
the growth of DAC during 5 years period prior to fraud year, and is calculated as [(DAC fraud year – DAC5 years prior to fraud year)/DAC5 
years prior to fraud year]. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Table 9 reveals that: both mean and median DAC are 
greater for fraud firms for two years and one year prior 
to fraud year; the mean of DAC is greater for three years 
prior to fraud year; and both mean and median of DAC are 
not significantly different between groups for four and 
five years prior to fraud year, implying that the practice 
of EM becomes more aggressive in the years immediately 
before the fraud year. Additionally, when we examined 
the growth of DAC over three and four year periods, 
both mean and median for the growth in DAC over these 
time periods are greater for the scandal firms than the 
no-scandal firms, suggesting that there is a significant 
decline in the accounting quality of the fraud firms. We 
hence conclude that the fraud firms have been consistently 
aggressive in their reporting practices for several years 
prior the accounting fraud. Finally, to make sure our 
results are not driven by our control sample of no-fraud 
firms, we performed regression analyses (not shown) with 
dummy variables for industries and log of assets (proxy 
for matching by size) in our regression models, which 
were not significant.
In essence, we conclude that when a firm’s economic 
troubles are no longer temporary, and EM cannot 
sufficiently disguise the firm’s failing condition, the 
managers may resort to fraud, that is mitigated if they can 
depend on RPTs, when non-founders own the company and 
cross directorship is lower.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Several additional tests were carried out to determine the 
sensitivity of the results and the robustness of the findings, 
by repeating the regression model, allowing for a different 
proxy to measure FOUND; and further re-examining it 
using a different proxy to measure RPTs. Finally, to test 
the robustness of the regression analysis performed earlier, 
audit fees was replaced by the auditor change as another 
proxy for AUDQ.
Alternative Measurement for Founders on Board  The 
argument in support of Hypothesis 1 is that founders have 
a significant influence over the BoDs, regardless of their 
ownership interest in the firm. This hypothesis is strongly 
supported in the multivariate analysis of the data (Tables 
6 and 7). A secondary test is to determine if the FOUND 
is important, or merely whether a single founder on the 
BoDs can cause this effect. 
In the earlier analysis during the fraud year, FOUND 
was treated as a ratio variable. Perhaps, the results on 
FOUND may have been better if the variable was treated as 
a continuous variable, FOUNDERNO, which is the number 
of founders on the BoDs. Table 10 shows a significant 
association between this variable and the incidence of FFR. 
The direction of coefficient and the level of significance 
is almost identical with the earlier findings, meaning that 
it is not only the percentage control of the BoDs, but 
Chap 9.indd   113 22/04/2015   14:22:24
114 Jurnal Pengurusan 42
FOUNDERNO could also influence the strategic accounting 
choice decision.
Al ternat ive  Measurement  for  Re la ted  Par ty 
Transactions  In the earlier analysis during fraud year, 
the RPTNO variable has a negative relationship with the 
occurrences of FFR, differing from other studies’ prediction 
of a positive relationship. This was tested using the value 
of related party transactions (RPTAMT) that indicates a 
deviant organisational culture, as presented in Table 11, 
where the overall results with variable RPTAMT do not 
change significantly from the basic model, suggesting 
consistent results concerning the direction of RPTAMT 
variable. However, it can be seen that the level of 
significance for RPTAMT experienced a modest decrease 
compared to the one in the earlier model since it is now 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level compared 
to the five percent level previously. This study indicates 
that RPTs are not necessarily a mechanism for fraud, and 
their presence need not indicate FFR. 
Alternative Measurement for Audit Quality  In the 
basic model during the fraud year, AUDQ is treated as a 
continuous variable measured by the ratio of audit fees 
to TA. This study found a significant negative association 
between AUDQ and the incidence of FFR, indicating less 
audit effort in assessing the audit risks during fraud year. 
To test the robustness of the regression analysis earlier, this 
study also investigated the effect of AUDQ using auditor 
change (AUDCHANGE). 
The available empirical evidence posits that short 
tenures of the auditor-client relationship are associated 
with reduced AUDQ, due to lack of client-specific 
knowledge. Similar to Summer and Sweeney (1998), 
AUDCHANGE is operationalised as a dichotomous variable 
representing a new client (if the auditor has been with the 
client for two years or less) (1), or an established client 
(0). A dummy variable, AUDCHANGE is incorporated in 
the regression model (see Table 12).
TABLE 10. Logistic regressions for fraud year (Number of founders on board)
   Model 1
	 	 Coefficient	(β)	 	 Wald
 Intercept -3.682*  3.348
 RPTs -0.186**  5.348
 PRIORS 3.002***  9.039
 FOUNDNO 1.763***  7.285
 DISTRESS 3.276***  9.324
 FAMOWN -0.081**  4.645
 FOREIGNOWN -0.033  0.964
 POLITICS -0.833  1.028
 CROSSDIR 4.881**  5.926
 BODIND -0.096  0.001
 AUDQ -1.370**  5.129  
 Cox & Snell R2 0.579 
 N 106
 Note: Logistic regressions for fraud year are reported in the table. The dependent variable is 1 for 
  fraud firms. *, **, *** denotes the significance at the10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
TABLE 11. Logistic regressions for fraud year (Amount of related party transactions)
   Model 1
	 	 Coefficient	(β)	 	 Wald
 Intercept -2.385  1.674
 RPT_AMT -0.007*  2.883
 PRIORS 2.118***  7.620
 FOUND 11.558***  6.249
 DISTRESS 2.958***  9.252
 FAMOWN -0.081**  5.600
 FOREIGNOWN -0.011  0.178
 POLITICS -0.770  0.972
 CROSSDIR 3.279*  3.396
 BODIND -0.683  0.071
 AUDQ -1.950**  5.729  
 Cox & Snell R2 0.565 
 N 106
 Notes: Logistic regressions for fraud year are reported in the table. The dependent variable is 1 for 
  fraud firms. RPT_AMT is the total amount of related party transactions the firm has. *, **, 
  *** denotes the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Consistent with the expectation and arguments 
that AUDQ (as proxied by AUDCHANGE) is lower in the 
early years of the auditor-client relationship, the study 
finds a significant positive relationship between recent 
AUDCHANGE and FFR, indicating that low AUDQ is 
associated with the incidence of fraud. In the previous 
regression model, low AUDQ, as proxied by low audit 
fees, seems to influence the incidence of fraud, whereas 
the result in Table 12 indicates that it contributes to fraud. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the incidence of FFR 
implies that the audits performed were of low quality. 
Hence, to the extent that a new auditor may be less familiar 
with the client’s industry, FFR may be more likely.
CONCLUSION
Accounting fraud is characterised by fewer RPTs, higher 
PRIORS, higher proportion of FOUND, higher DISTRESS, 
higher CROSSDIR and lower AUDQ. We also find that firms 
with family and foreign investors are less likely to have 
enforcement actions against them. 
There is no evidence that POLITICS and BODIND play 
a role in FFR, possibly because the investigations by SC 
may itself be subjected to political agendas (Gunasegaram 
2007), as the SC itself is not a fully independent agency.8 
The insignificant positive relationship between BODIND 
and accounting fraud raises questions of whether 
independent directors in Malaysia are truly independent 
or just fulfilling Code requirements. 
Our findings suggest that in emerging economies, 
the institutional and external audit environment, and 
the flexibility in financial reporting, have significant 
implications for FFR. External auditors seem to be unable 
to screen their clients for EM that can eventually lead to 
FFR. Also, RPTs, prior violations of securities laws and 
the ownership structure are better predictors of FFR than 
BODIND.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
to test whether EM practice may escalate to the level of 
accounting fraud, by providing evidence that EM has a 
positive and significant relationship with FFR, which 
confirms that EM practices, in addition to other governance 
variables, affect the probability of FFR. In addition, the 
findings reveal that fraud firms have been consistently 
aggressive in their reporting practices for several years 
prior the accounting fraud. Finally, it should be pointed 
out that for investors who are looking for a quick fix 
to the accounting fraud, governance changes alone are 
insufficient. The culture where founders and managers 
“live or die” based on whether they meet earnings targets 
could also be blamed. Thus, given the substantial costs 
associated with accounting fraud, the value of analysis 
of financial statement information to detect accrual 
management should be emphasised to help identify 
aggressive earnings management. A limitation of this 
study is the dichotomous measure of the materiality of 
fraud, which treats all frauds equally. Future studies 
should capture a more robust measure of FFR. To help 
develop “red flags,” we also encourage similar studies be 
conducted in other emerging economies in order to verify 
whether the same fraud factors used in our study can be 
used in other developing countries.
The study suggests that regulators need to strengthen 
the legal regime and the firms’ level of transparency to 
an acceptable level. All related parties must be jointly 
responsible, and be willing to handle this issue. The 
political will must also be there to let all corporate 
wrongdoings come to light.
TABLE 12. Logistic regressions for fraud year (auditor change)
    Model 1
	 	 	 Coefficient	(β)	 	 Wald
 Intercept  -4.258**  3.933
 RPTs  -0.222***  7.079
 PRIORS  3.108***  8.537
 FOUND  13.338***  9.046
 DISTRESS  3.618***  8.739
 FAMOWN  -0.055*  2.587
 FOREIGNOWN  0.011  0.045
 POLITICS  0.243  0.076
 CROSSDIR  3.299*  3.096
 BODIND  -3.019  1.203
 AUDCHANGE  3.367***  6.763  
 Cox & Snell R2 0.586 
 N 106
 Note: Logistic regressions for fraud year are reported in the table. The dependent variable is 1 for fraud 
  firms.  AUDCHANGE is operationalized as a dichotomous variable representing a new client 
  (1), or an established client (0). *, **, *** denotes the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
  levels, respectively.
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ENDNOTES
1 An overview of the transition is available at Malaysian 
Securities Commission’s website: see http://www.sc.com.
my.
2 We use the term related party transaction as defined in 
Financial Reporting Standard 124, MASB Regulation:
 A transfer of resources, services or obligations between 
related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged. 
A party is related to an entity if (a) directly or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, the party controls, is 
controlled by or is under common  control with, the entity 
(this includes parents, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries); 
has an interest in the entity that gives it significant influence 
over the entity; or has joint control over the entity; (b) the 
party is an associate of the entity; (c) the party is joint 
venture in which the entity is a venturer; (d) the party is a 
member of the key management personnel of the entity or 
its parents; (e) the party is a close member of the family; (f) 
the party is a post employment benefit plan for the benefit 
of employees of the entity.
3 See Cull and Xu (2005) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
for evidence of preferential access  to credit; Dinc (2005) 
and Backman (1999) for evidence of preferential treatment 
by government owned banks; Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) 
for preferential treatment in the award of government 
contracts and Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2007) for 
bailouts.
4 See Cull and Xu (2005) and Svensson (2003) for discussion 
of bribes and Fan and Wong (2007) for vote-buying 
behaviour.
5 In terms of representation of the population of listed firms, 
our fraud sample represents approximately 4.7 percent of 
listed firms in Malaysia (47 firms divided by an average of 
1,000 listed firms). This compares favorably to the fraud 
sample proportions of approximately 0.75 percent (75 
fraud firms divided by 10,000) in Beasley (1996) and 0.78 
percent (78 fraud firms divided by 10,000) in Abbott, Park 
and Parker (2000).
6 We have no intention to analyse the consequences of fraud 
as we could not obtain the data required. We learned that 
a majority of the fraud firms did not survive whereby 28% 
of fraud firms went out of business (mostly due to financial 
reasons) and 26% of the firms were acquired by other 
companies.
7 To test the assertion that founders engage in illegal activities 
to ensure the survival of the firm, we performed our analyses 
with additional interaction FOUND_DISTRESS variable 
for the fraud year. We found a moderately significant 
(0.089) and positive coefficient for FOUND_DISTRESS. 
This result was in line with expectations and supported 
our view that founders have strong motivation for 
fraudulent financial reporting to camouflage weak financial 
performance in an attempt to minimise the negative impact 
of financial distress.
8 The SC of Malaysia is a self-funding statutory body with 
investigative and enforcement powers. It reports to the 
Minister of Finance and its accounts are tabled in Parliament 
annually.
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